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Conditionals and Unconditionals in 
Universal Grammar and Situation 
Semantics 
D I E T M A R Z A E F F E R E R 
Although conditional sentences are important in all languages, and 
although their 'logic' has been thoroughly, if inconclusively, investi-
gated by philosophers, our knowledge and understanding of them in 
the languages of the world is very poor. (Palmer 1986, 188) 
Introduction 
I don't think the Situation in the theory of conditionals is as bad as char-
acterized by Palmer in the above quotation. In a companion paper to the 
present one (Zaefferer 1990) I have tried to show that cross-linguistic com-
parison of the constructions that encode conditional functions, together 
with the assumption that other functions encoded by the same or similar 
constructions tend to be structurally related, gives good support for those 
logical analyses of the natural language conditionals that treat them as 
encoding some kind of restricted modal function. In doing this I have ar-
gued that both the research in typology and linguistic universals on the one 
hand, and formal semantics and language-oriented logics on the other, will 
profit if they Start communicating with one another. Whereas the other 
paper emphasizes the typological data, while presenting the theory only in 
rough outline, the present paper will just summarize the typological find-
ings and then spell out the core of the theory.1 But it begins with some 
terminological clarifications and methodological remarks that may prove 
helpful. 
*ln developing it, I have profited from discussions with and comments from Godehard 
Link, Hans Rott, Barbara Partee, John Perry, and an anonymous referee. 
Situation Theory and I t s Applications. 
Robin Cooper, Kuniaki Mukai, and John Perry, eds. 
Copyright © 1990, Stanford University. 
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Terminological Clarifications 
First: What do I understand by a conditional? A conditional or more ex-
plicitly a conditional f o r m is a grammatical structure or construction that 
encodes a conditional function as its primary purpose. A n d what is a con-
ditional function? A conditional f u n c t i o n is something that conditionalizes 
any proposition q, i.e., that converts q into the proposition that something, 
normally the holding of some given proposition p, is in a way sufficient for 
the holding of q. 
I will call the proposition that is to be conditionalized the consequent, 
the conditionalizing proposition the antecedent, and the result of the con-
ditionalization the conditionalized proposition or c-proposition, reserving 
these Latin terms for the semantic level. On the syntactic level, I will use 
the Greek terms apodosis and protasis: 'apodosis' for the unmodified (but 
sometimes marked) superordinate linguistic form (main clause without sub-
ordinate clause), 'protasis' for the modifying subordinate form (clause), and 
c-construction for the combination of the two (main clause together with 
subordinate clause). 
Please note that, taken this way, most of the time the apodosis encodes 
just the consequent, but the protasis does not only encode the antecedent, 
but also the conditional relation it Stands in with respect to the consequent, 
in other words it normally encodes the whole conditional function that takes 
the consequent as an argument. So normally the protasis equals the con-
ditional form or, shorter, the conditional. The division of labor among the 
three linguistic forms varies however from language to language and from 
construction to construction. Note further that in addition both protasis 
and apodosis can explicitly encode quantification over various instantiations 
of the consequent with respect to various instantiations of the antecedent. 
Second: What is an unconditional? A n unconditional or more explic-
itly an u n c o n d i t i o n a l f o r m is a grammatical structure or construction that 
encodes an unconditional function as its primary purpose. And what is an 
unconditional function? A n u n c o n d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is something that de-
conditionalizes any proposition g, i.e., that converts q into the proposition 
that the holding of any one of a given set of propositions P is in a way 
sufficient for the holding of g, where P exhausts the set of options that 
are taken into consideration at the present State of the discourse, in other 
words the proposition that the holding of q is unconditional on the question 
which one of the members of P happens to be true, where it is implicated, 
if not tautological, that at least one of them in fact is true. 
Sentences (1) and (2) are examples of an English conditional and un-
conditional construction, respectively. 
(1) If a kangaroo loses its tail, it topples over. 
(2) Whether you like it or not, I won't permit smoking here. 
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Third: What do I understand by universal grammar? By a universal 
grammar in the wide sense I want to understand the union of the descrip-
tions of all natural human languages, and by a universal grammar in the 
narrow sense its intersection, i.e., its greatest common denominator. Of 
course, at the present State of the art in descriptive linguistics, universal 
grammar in the wide sense is far from being complete even for the contem-
porary languages, but that does not mean that universal grammar in the 
narrow sense cannot be approaching a State of relative stability at least in 
certain domains (although surprises are always possible). 
Last: What do I understand by Situation semantics? By Situation se-
mantics I understand a semantics with the following features: 
(a) it is strongly intensional, i.e., it does not reduce intensions to param-
eterized extensions, but takes them as primitives; 
(b) it takes partiality serious, i.e., it accounts for the fact that normally 
what we talk about is not a complete world, but some portion thereof; 
(c) it takes indexicality serious, i.e., it accounts for the fact that natural 
languages owe their structure to the need for efficient, not for maxi-
mally explicit and safe, communication, and that they therefore tend 
to encode only what is left open by the utterance Situation. 
Methodological Remarks 
The starting point of my investigations was the intuition that the notion of 
a background, which plays a key role in Barwise's 1986 paper on condition-
als, needs more structuring if it is to help in an account of both conditionals 
and unconditionals. This intuition stemmed from the Observation that un-
conditionals tend to be encoded by a certain class of interrogative sentences, 
and that sentences of this kind share the property of preparing the grounds 
for the subsequent discourse in a certain way. 
Before I specify what I mean by that, I would like to leave for the 
following section the domain of abstract considerations and to summarize 
the cross-linguistic overview of the structural domain of the conditional 
forms with their relatives and of the conceptual field of the conditional 
functions with their relatives that I have presented in Zaefferer (1990). 
Why? Because it is a well-known universal tendency that polysemy is 
much more widespread than homonymy, i.e., identical forms tend to encode 
systematically related concepts rather than being the result of accidental 
historical convergence of semantically unrelated signs. And this rule can be 
generalized: 
(PI) Identical or related forms tend to encode related concepts, 
where relatedness of form is defined as phonological and structural similar-
ity, and this in turn as number of common features, and where relatedness 
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of concepts is defined as either similarity again (cf. metaphors) or as conti-
guity, especially in the subconcept-superconcept hierarchy (cf. metonymy). 
Conceptual relatedness need not be universal, 2 but there must be a core 
domain of universally related concepts in the conceptual fields of all linguis-
tic communities, eise mutual understanding and translation would be much 
harder than it is. Which conceptual fields are in this universal domain, 
and what is their universal structure? If our principle (PI) is correct, then 
cross-linguistically recurring patterns of relatedness of forms indicate relat-
edness of the encoded concepts and make the latter good candidates for 
universally related concepts. Let me State this as principle (P2): 
(P2) Cross-linguistically recurring patterns of formal and conceptual re-
latedness indicate universality of the conceptual relations. 
Concepts like the ones encoded by logical constants, and the relations 
among them are of course top candidates for universal conceptual structures 
(van Benthem 1990), but it is also important to see how logical concepts link 
up with non-logical ones, and here recurring relatedness patterns in both 
form and function offer an important window on the common denominator 
of human conceptual Systems. 
Therefore in order to understand fully what conditionalization in natural 
languages is, it is helpful, I submit, to look at it in the context of universally 
related concepts. So the working hypothesis for the following overview is a 
specialization of principle (PI): 
(Plc) Relatives of conditional forms tend to encode concepts that are rel-
atives of conditional functions. 
1 Conditional and Related Forms and Functions 
in Universal Grammar 
1.1 Conditional Forms in English 
Conditional functions are proposition modifiers, consequently, conditional 
forms are sentence adverbials.3 Therefore, like other sentence adverbials, 
they can be of one of the following types: 
(a) Lexical adverbials, i.e., adverbs; 
2To cite one example: In Western Europe, the concepts 'heart' and 'positive emotion' 
are related concepts, in Japan, the same holds for 'belly' and 'positive emotion'. 
3 The existence of coordinated conditional clauses as in 'Pay him well and he will do 
anything for you' and 'You close the door behind you and you feel arrested' (describing 
a room) seems to be at variance with this Statement, but it can be argued that the 
combination of an imperative-first conjunct with an indicative-second conjunct in fact 
turns the former into an adverbial, and that in the other case it is not the primary 
function of the first conjunct to conditionalize the second one. 
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(b) Phrasal adverbials, i.e., prepositional phrases and other sub-clausal 
constructions; or 
(c) Sentential adverbials, i.e., adverbial clauses. 
Lexical conditionals in English are restricted to a few words. Let's examine 
three examples: 
(1) T h e n we are really in trouble. 
(2) Mathematical problems are sometimes very hard to solve. 
(3) Swimming is not always easy. 
To see what makes then, sometimes, and always lexical conditionals, con-
sider the following three sentences: 
(4) U n d e r these circumstances we are really in trouble. 
(5) Mathematical problems are i n some cases very hard to solve. 
(6) Swimming is not under a l l conditions easy. 
And if these examples of phrasal conditionals are not convincing either, 
consider the following clausal ones: 
(7) / / all our money is lost we are really in trouble. 
(8) Mathematical problems are very hard to solve when they a r e posed 
by a malevolent expert. 
(9) Swimming is not easy if you haven't practiced for a long w h i l e . 
Now it is easy to see that not only (7)-(9), but also (l)-(6) involve genuine 
conditionals. First imagine a context like the one created by (10): 
(10) I'm afraid all our money is lost. 
Clearly, in such a context, (1), (4) and (7) are local paraphrases of each 
other. Furthermore, putting special contexts aside, it is obvious that (2) 
and (5) follow from (8), as well as (3) and (6) follow from (9), and it possible 
to cook up clausal z/-paraphrases also for examples (2) and (3). 
Now let's have a closer look at the l e x i c a l conditionals. A l l of them are 
structure words, i.e., they encode structural, and not lexical meaning. T h e n 
is an anaphoric pro-form that refers to a previously mentioned proposition 
and puts it into the role of an antecedent, i.e., a form that encodes a condi-
tion. Its meaning can therefore be analyzed into two parts: the anaphorical 
pointer at some given proposition, and the two-place conditional function, 
i.e., the function that takes this proposition and converts it into a one-place 
conditional function. 
Sometimes and always, on the other hand, do not refer at all, they are 
adverbs of quantification that in our examples quantify not over times, but 
over conditions. Therefore their meaning can be analyzed as consisting of 
two difFerent parts, a quantifier and a sortal indication of what is quantified 
over, namely conditions ("times" or "ways"). 
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A l l examples for phrasal conditionals given above were prepositional 
phrases with the same anaphoric and quantificational properties as just 
discussed in the context of the lexical conditionals, except that they are 
more specific than these since they distinguish between cases, conditions, 
and circumstances. But like the lexical conditionals, they do not spell out 
the conditions they are alluding at, and this does not come as a surprise, 
since conditions are propositions in a special role, and propositions are 
normally encoded by clauses, so the normal, füll and independent expression 
of a condition is a clausal conditional. 
C l a u s a l conditionals are exemplified in (7)-(9) above. In (7) the protasis 
is 'If all our money is lost', expressing the conditional function with the 
antecedent that all our money is lost. The apodosis is 'we are really in 
trouble', expressing the consequent proposition that we are really in trouble. 
(7) itself is the c-construction, and the c-proposition expressed by it is the 
proposition that the truth of the antecedent, namely that all our money is 
lost, is sufficient for or requires the truth of the consequent, i.e., that we 
are really in trouble. In other words whatever circumstances might make 
it true that all our money is lost also make it true that we are really in 
trouble. And similarly for (8) and (9). 
We haven't looked yet at clausal counterparts for (2) and (3), the quan-
tified examples, but they are easy to construct, cf. (11) and (12). 
(11) Sometimes if you want to take a subway train it is already füll. 
(12) If something is very expensive, it is not always also very good. 
The examples show that both quantifying protases and quantifying apo-
doses exist. The semantic effect is in both cases the same, since what is 
quantified over are conditions, i.e., circumstances that are sufficient for the 
truth of the antecedent, and the quantification scope is the consequent, 
Thus the c-proposition expressed by (11) is the proposition that in some 
cases the truth of the antecedent, namely that some person wants to take 
the subway train x , suffices also for the truth of the consequent, i.e., that x 
is already füll. And the c-proposition expressed by (12) is the proposition 
that the truth of the antecedent, namely that some thing y is very expen-
sive, does not in all cases suffice for the truth of the consequent, i.e., that 
y is very good. 
So we have to distinguish between bare and quantifying c-constructions 
and accordingly between bare and quantifying c-propositions. 
1.2 Conditional and Related Forms with their Functions 
Across Languages 
So far we have looked only at markers for protasis clauses that happened 
to be particles or subordinating conjunctions like z/, or i n case, but it is 
well known that there are more means for marking clauses as protases, or 
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more generally as c-constructions, in the languages of the world (cf. Comrie 
1986, Danielsen 1968), and also in English and German. 
They can be arranged in the following four groups: 
(a) Morphological conditional markers 
i . Conditional verbal mood afRxes 
i i . Conditional clausal function affixes 
(b) Lexical conditional markers, such as subordinating particles 
(c) Phrasal conditional markers, such as prepositional phrases or modifi-
cations of some complementizer 
(d) Structural conditional markers, such as marked constituent order 
We next look at the relatives of the conditional forms, including the same 
forms with different readings, and at their functions. If (Plc) above is 
correct, this will amount to giving an overview of those concepts that are 
tendentially most closely related to the conditional function. 
(a) Formal relatives of the morphological conditional markers with their 
functions 
i . Verb inflection: Other verbal moods, aspect, time reference 
i i . Clausal topic markers: Topicality 
(b) Formal relatives of the lexical conditional markers: 
i . Interrogative subordinators: Interrogative sentence mood 
i i . Temporal subordinators: Time reference 
i i i . Local subordinators: Spatial location 
iv. Causal subordinators: Causal connectedness 
v. Concessive subordinators: Marked (unusual) co-occurrence 
(c) Formal relatives of the phrasal conditional markers 
Prepositional phrases: spatial, temporal, causal and concessive spec-
ification, restriction of the validity of a claim to certain aspects of its 
topic Situation, as in (*): 
(*) In certain respects, this has been an extraordinary meeting. 
(d) Formal relatives of the structural conditional markers 
Marked constituent order: sentence mood, especially interrogative 
and imperative 
This is considerable evidence that the concepts of verbal and sentential 
mood, especially interrogativity and imperativity, aspect, topicality, tem-
poral and spatial location, causal connection, and marked co-occurrence 
are relatives of the notion of conditionality. This is especially true with 
respect to temporal location, more precisely co-occurrence, which is a typi-
cal companion of conditionality. The relation to interrogativity is also quite 
obvious since both interrogative and conditional utterances raise issues, and 
the same holds for clausal topics. 
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1.3 Summary 
Summing up the results of our attempt in Section 1 to place conditionals 
into the context of their conceptual relatives across languages, we can say 
that we have found good evidence for the following assumptions: 
(a) Conditionalization is a modal concept, i.e., a conditionalized propo-
sition is a modalized proposition. Hence conditionals are modal Op-
erators. Just as you can say 'possibly' and 'necessarily', you can say 
in a way 'conditionally', 'unconditionally', and 'p-conditionally.' 
(b) To conditionalize a proposition is to localize it (in a metaphorical 
sense) in a hypothetical domain and thereby to relativize the validity 
of the consequent. 
(c) The kind of modality expressed is according to the quantifier in the 
explicitly quantifying conditionals (just as their temporal and local 
relatives), and it is some kind of accompaniment with bare condi-
tionals, whose precise nature cannot determined from the data and 
remains to be specified. 
It is interesting to note that the research on conditionals in logically oriented 
formal semantics in the last twenty years came up with several accounts 
that can be interpreted as difTerent attempts at spelling out one or the 
other specification of exactly this idea, although most of their authors did 
their in-depth-analyses without looking at languages other than their own. 
2 A Situation Semantics for Conditionals and 
Unconditionals 
2.1 The Inadequacy of Material Implication and Some 
Proposais for How to Overcome It 
Several years ago, at the 1986 C L S meeting, Angelika Kratzer told the 
sad story of the decline of the Gricean account in the analysis of natural 
language conditionals (Kratzer 1986). The Gricean account tries to stick 
to material implication by explaining away its well-known problems with 
Grice's well-known implicatures, and Kratzer argues that this does not 
work. A l l her arguments have to do with quantiflcation and modality and 
are therefore in line with our cross-linguistic evidence that conditionaliza-
tion is a modal concept. It is interesting to note in passing that she does not 
mention a very simple way to show that modality is involved, an account 
of which can be found in Link (1979) and elsewhere. It goes as follows. 
From the assumption that the natural conditional construction encodes the 
material implication and that the 'it is not the case'-construction encodes 
weak negation, it follows that (1) and (2) below are paraphrases of each 
other (the corresponding formulae are logically equivalent). But they are 
not paraphrases. (1) follows from (2), but not vice versa. 
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(1) It is not the case that it thunders if it lightens. 
(2) It lightens and it doesn't thunder. 
What does follow from (1), and indeed seems a good paraphrase of it, is 
(3) , and this shows that (1) contains a hidden generalizing m o d a l element 
under the negation Operator. 
(3) It's possible that both it lightens and it doesn't thunder. 
Therefore what at first glance looks like a good paraphrase for the condi-
tional construction in the 'that'-clause of (1), namely (4), turns out to be 
an implicit way of saying what is more explicitly said by (5): 
(4) Lightening doesn't occur without thundering. 
(5) Lightening doesn't possibly occur without thundering. 
Example (5) in turn invites paraphrases like (6) or (7), and there we are 
right at the heart of a modern formal account of conditionals. 
(6) Any l ightening Si tuat ion comes w i t h a S i tuat ion where it thunders. 
(7) Any case of lightening is accompanied by a case of thundering. 
One important step in the right direction was Lewis's treatment (1975) 
of adverbs of quantification as quantifiers over cases. Then Angelika Kratzer 
(1978, 1981), drawing on Lewis's and other work, developed a unified theory 
of modality, that included not only a treatment of deontic and doxastic 
modal verbs, but also indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Lewis (1973) 
had treated the latter in a very similar fashion, introducing the notion of 
a variably strict conditional. Irene Heim (1982), working in parallel with 
Hans Kamp, embedded the conditionals into an incremental semantics, and 
Jon Barwise (1986) rethought the old story in terms of strong intensionality, 
i.e., without possible worlds but, like Kratzer, with the important notion 
of background as a relativization device. 
Backgrounds can of course be compared with epistemic states, which 
are at the core of conditional logics like Gärdenfors's, but at least one 
important difference has to be born in mind: As Barwise has argued, I 
think convincingly, the Speaker might not know all the relevant background 
conditions. However, if one rethinks belief change as incremental (or better 
step-by-step) specif ication of the described Situat ion, theories of epistemic 
d y n a m i c s can be brought to bear i n the development of S i tuat ion semantics, 
and that is exact ly what I am going to propose. 
Gärdenfors's logic for conditionals is based on the Ramsey test, which 
says that a c-construction is an element of a given epistemic State K just 
in case its apodosis is an element of the epistemic State that is the result of 
revising K to contain the protasis. This is what the following formula says: 
(R) A>BeKiffBeKA 
Recently, Gärdenfors (1988, chap. 7) has come to doubt the role of the 
Ramsey test as a basic ingredient of conditionals, since in non-trivial cases, 
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it contradicts some monotonicity assumptions. But Hans Rott (1989) has 
argued that monotonicity is questionable anyway and that the incompati-
bility results should therefore not be turned against the Ramsey test. Since 
the Ramsey test-based conditional relation holds between any two sentences 
A and B that are already in K, which doesn't seem to be desirable, Rott 
proposes to replace it by a relation that is based on what he calls the strong 
Ramsey test. It requires not only the presence of B in the A-revision of K, 
but also its absence in the non-^l-revision of K. This is formally expressed 
in (SR): 
(SR) A ^ B e K iff BeKAkB<£ K^A 
The strong Ramsey test shows clearly the modal or dispositional character 
of conditionals, for it relates ' i f A , then B ' with two mutually exclusive 
alternative revisions of K. 
I think that the intention behind the strengthening of the Ramsey test 
is correct, but that it results in an overkill. Remember that according to 
the original Ramsey test both ' i f A then #' and ' if B then A* are in K, once 
both ' A ' and ' £ ' are in K. That certainly does not seem to be intuitively 
warranted. But now with the strong Ramsey test we exclude the possibility 
that both ' if A then B ' and ' if not-A then B ' are in K, which doesn't seem to 
be intuitively adequate either, especially since the conjunction of the latter 
two seems to be a good paraphrase for a special case of our unconditionals, 
namely 'whether A or not->l, B \ 
So it looks like we may be better off if we give up epistemic State revi-
sions altogether in favor of something eise, which could be called Situation 
specification Updates. Here is how such an approach can be conceived. 
2.2 Situation Specification Updates and an Update 
Semantics for Conditionals 
The following picture of a typologically backed account of conditionals and 
related constructions integrates features from all the approaches mentioned 
in the last section. Its main innovation is a distinction between that char-
acter izat ion of the described Si tuat ion that is actually accepted, and those 
characterizations of the same or some related situations that are only taken 
into consideration. This differentiation seems to be needed if one wants to 
account for both the similarities and the differences between conditionals 
and their relatives, especially unconditionals, but its introduction has been 
motivated in the first place by the desire to account for non-declarative 
sentences. Interrogatives for instance in their normal use don't contribute 
to the accepted description of the intended topic Situation, but only to the 
Stack of descriptions that are thematized. 
I call this approach update semantics because progress in discourse is 
conceived of as constant updating at both the discourse level, i.e., the de-
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velopment of the discourse situation(s), a n d the discourse content level, 
i.e., the character izat ion of the described s i tuation(s) . Every update takes 
place w i t h respect to a background that has been created by the preceding 
discourse, i f any, or eise by the start-up assumptions. 
The factual discourse background contains the actual discourse Si tuat ion 
i n c l u d i n g its history, i.e., (at least) the s i tuations that are made real by the 
preceding discourse, as subsituations, together w i t h some character izat ion 
of i t ; the actual discourse options are those possible continuations of the 
actua l discourse S i tuat ion that are open to the part ic ipants . E .g. , i f Max 
Utters to M i a first "It's gett ing dark." and t h e n "What t ime is i t ? " , t h e n 
n o r m a l l y that creates first a factual discourse background containing a Sit-
uat ion of the type Max asserting towards M i a that it is gett ing d a r k a n d a 
set of a c t u a l discourse options conta ining for M i a among others the Option 
of c o m m e n t i n g o n t h a t , a n d t h e n a factual discourse background c o n t a i n i n g 
i n a d d i t i o n a S i tuat ion of the type Max asking M i a for the t ime a n d a set 
of a c t u a l discourse opt ions conta ining for M i a among others the Option of 
answering the quest ion a n d the Option of rejecting i t . 
Now before I go on to say something about the factual and the Virtual 
content background, I have to answer three questions: 
(a) What corresponds to a belief revision i n update semantics? 
(b) How does this n o t i o n of background relate to Barwise's n o t i o n of 
background? 
(c) How do the answers to these two questions relate to the Austinian 
concept ion of a proposi t ion? 
The answer to the first question a n d to part of the last one is this: A 
propos i t ion p is always about a Situation s p , w h i c h I w i l l ca l l the intended 
topic Si tuat ion of p; a n d it says of this sp that i t is of a type tp, w h i c h I w i l l 
ca l l the character iz ing Si tuat ion type of p, or simply the type of p. Formally, 
a p r o p o s i t i o n p is a n ordered tr iple (sp,sup,tp), w r i t t e n (sp sup tp), where 
sup is the supports-re lat ion. This makes sense since Situation types are not 
dist inguished from informat iona l units or infons. A proposi t ion p is true 
just i n case sp Supports tp. 
Now the update semantical counterpart of a belief change i n epistemic 
d y n a m i c s is i n the simplest case (and only this case w i l l be considered 
here) an a d d i t i o n a l character izat ion of the same intended topic S i tuat ion 
(expansion). So the Austinian not ion of a proposi t ion is d y n a m i c i z e d into a n 
Austinian picture of growing discourse content. Once the end of a discourse 
Stretch is reached, this is of course indist inguishable f rom the o l d picture. 
But the d y n a m i c picture helps also to State identi ty cr i ter ia for discourse 
Stretches: The end of a Stretch of discourse is reached once the intended 
topic S i tuat ion is changed. E .g. , Max 's two utterances c i ted above belong to 
the same Stretch of discourse since they are about the same intended topic 
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Situat ion, n a m e l y the factual discourse Situation. A n u t terance of 'Joe is 
probably still asleep' w o u l d change the topic S i t u a t i o n , if it is k n o w n to 
Max and M i a that Joe lives in Hawaii. 
How does this picture go together with Barwise's n o t i o n of a back-
ground? A discourse cannot Start off from zero, i.e., without any charac-
ter izat ion of w h a t the intended t o p i c Situation is and w h a t it looks like, 
but it has to s tart off from some mostly quite general initial characteristics, 
which come from the pre-discourse S i tuation and which I w o u l d like to call 
the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n of a discourse content So the content of a discourse at 
any of its states is the result of a sequence of Updates of its initialization. 
Barwise's examples are compatible with the view that what he has in mind 
when he speaks of backgrounds for condit ionals is exactly what I call the 
initialization of a discourse content. One of his main points, that back-
grounds need not be (fully) known to discourse participants, can be argued 
analogously with respect to content initializations. 
If this is correct, then my notion of a factual content background differs 
from Barwise's insofar as it does not only refer to the initialization of a 
discourse content, but also to its State at the moment when a new discourse 
contribution is made, and the two coincide only in the case of the very first 
contribution to a discourse. But maybe I am missing here what Barwise 
had in mind and the two notions coincide entirely. 
The default initialization of a Standard discourse (as opposed to its con-
tent) could be spelled out as 'Normal circumstances obtain'. This excludes 
spatial Separation of the discourse participants as well as emergency situ-
ations etc. Cooperative discourse participants are obliged to update this 
initialization explicitly if it is not obvious that it is wrong. 
Having said this I can say w h a t the f a c t u a l content background is. It 
is the Austinian p r o p o s i t i o n character iz ing the intended top ic S i tuat ion as 
being of that type that is the result of changing the discourse initialization 
by the preceding discourse contributions and that is accepted as factual by 
the discourse participants. B y contrast, the V i r t u a l content background is a 
set of alternatives, of ways the intended topic Situation and some related 
situations could be and that are thematized. The set of all these issues, as I 
will call them w i t h a term b o r r o w e d from Perry, exhausts the alternatives of 
the factual proposition that are taken into consideration at the present State 
of the discourse. So issues are propositions, that need neither be asserted 
nor accepted as true, and a content background can be modeled as a triple 
( p , I , </) with p G Prop, I £ 2Prop, and </ a pre-order, i.e., a reflexive and 
transitive relation, on / , where p is the accepted proposition alias actual 
content background, / is the set of thematic issues alias Virtual content 
background, and < / induces a saliency ranking on them w i t h normally, but 
not necessarily, one topmost element. 
Every assertive discourse contribution Updates first the Virtual content 
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background and only if it is accepted is it copied to the factual content 
background. If it is rejected or retracted, it stays in the Virtual part of the 
background or is even deleted from there. 
Formally, this means that the update-function, which is 2-place, taking 
content backgrounds and discourse contributions to content backgrounds 
(update: B x C —• ß ) , needs contributions from all discourse participants 
(including silence), before it affects the factual discourse background. 
In the above example, Max's first discourse contribution has added to 
the Virtual content background and then, because M i a didn't object, to the 
factual content background, a characterization by the type 'it is getting 
late': 
(a) update(((s sup er),/, </), Max says to M i a (s sup r ) ) 
= ({s sup er),/',<//), 
where s is the discourse Situat ion, a the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n type, 
I and </ the i n i t i a l issues with their pre-order, 
and r = ((getting-late)); 
/ ' = J U {(s sup er A r )}; and <//=</ U{((s sup er), (s sup er A r))} 
(where ((s sup er A r ) , (s sup er)) & < / / ) . 
(b) update(((s sup <r), </>), M i a aeeepts) = ((s sup er A r ) , <//). 
Max's second discourse contribution has not changed the factual content 
background, but has changed the Virtual content background by adding an 
issue whose type subsumes the parametric type 'it is x o'clock'. 
(c) update(((s sup er A r ) , / ' , <'7), Max says to M i a (s sup p)) 
= ((s sup a A r), J " , </"), 
where p = ((x, o'clock)), 
J " = J ' U {(s sup a A T A p)}, 
and </"=</ ' U{((s sup er A r ) , (s sup er A T A p ) ) } 
(where ((s sup er A r A p), (s sup er A r)) 0 </')• 
The factual content background is modeled by an Austinian proposition 
with a parameter for the intended t o p i c S i t u a t i o n and a possibly paramet-
ric type for its characterization. A discourse wil l be called true just in case 
the result of anchoring the former parameter to the factual intended topic 
Situat ion 5, and of anchoring all parameters in the type to const i tuents of s 
is a true p r o p o s i t i o n . The set of propositions that forms the Virtual content 
background of a discourse does not play a direct role in its truth conditions, 
only indirectly via the build-up of the factual background. 
Wi th this basic picture of update semantics in mind, how can we cap-
ture the semantics of conditionals? In other words, how can we now make 
formal sense of intuitions like the one expressed in sentence (7) (which is 
repeated below)? Especially, what do 'Any case' and 'aecompany' mean in 
that context? 
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(7) Any case of lightening is accompanied by a case of thundering. 
I think, the lesson to be learned from Ramsey and Gärdenfors is that con-
ditional propositions are about Updates and that therefore updating by a 
contribution with a conditional propositional content is some sort of meta-
update that concerns other Updates, be they in the future or in the past. So 
what we need in order to model that idea is quantification over situations 
and corresponding anchors. 
Here is the formal setup: 
Situations and relations with their argument roles are taken as primi-
tives. Arguments may be primitive or defined entities. Types or infons are 
defined as follows: 
Basic infons: If R is a relation and a is a (possibly empty) function 
from the argument roles of R to its arguments, then ((a.R)} is a basic infon. 
Nullary basic infons are written simply as ((i?)). Sometimes, if a(ro) = 
xo, • • •> and a(r n ) = x n , ((xo,. . . , x n , R)) is used instead of ((a, R ) ) . 
Infons: If er, r are infons, x is a parameter, and £ a set of infons, then 
all of the following are infons as well: 
(a) ->cr 
(b) c A T 
(c) 3xcr 
(d) i f a ( r ) 
(e) x - e v e r a ( r ) 
(f) w h e t h e r T , { r ) 
A n c h o r i n g infons i n situations: Let s be a S i tuat ion and er an infon. 
Then / is an s-anchor for er iff / is a function from the parameters of er in 
the constituents of s. 
Deciding and supporting infons: A S i tuat ion s together with an infon 
er can be conceived of as an issue, which is decided just in case s is rieh 
enough to conta in all constituents of er i n c l u d i n g its relations. In that case 
we say s decides <7, or shorter, 5 dec er. If s decides er positively we say s 
Supports er, or shorter, s sup er. If s decides er then either s Supports er or 
s Supports -«er, but not b o t h . 
Restricted parameters: If x is a parameter and er an infon that is para-
metric in x, then x[er] is a restricted parameter. If r is a parametric object 
that is parametric in x[cr], then for every Si tuat ion s and any s-anchor / for 
r it holds that s dec r[f] only if s sup cr[f]. 
(Dl ) Truth condition for contents with factual propositions involving basic 
or existentially quantified infons: 
((5 sup er),/, </) 
(or equivalently ((s sup 3xcr),/, </)) is true iff 
3f[f e s-anchors(er)] : s sup cr[f]. 
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(D2) Truth condition for Contents with factual propositions involving neg-
ative infons: 
({s sup --er),/, </) 
is true iff 
->3/[/ G 5-anchors((j) & s dec cr[f]] : s sup cr[f]. 
(D3) Truth condition for contents with factual propositions involving con-
joined infons: 
({s sup CT Ar) , / ,< / ) 
is true iff both 
((s sup er), I , < i ) and ((s sup r ) , I , < / ) 
are true. 
So much for the basic set-up; but what do we have to do in order to interpret 
issues with infons of the critical form (d), i.e., conditionals? 
F i r s t , we have to model cases not as tuples of participants, as Lewis 
(1975) did (since, e.g., raining is nullary 4), but as situations, which in turn 
are conceived of as s u p p o r t i n g Si tuat ion types or infons. 
Second, we have to speeify the kind of update that is made if an assertion 
of a conditional issue (or other speech act with a c-propositional content) 
is contributed to the discourse. We said that we have to quantify over 
situations and corresponding anchors in order to spell out the 'any case' 
and to then say what we mean by 'aecompany'. I propose to model the 
'any' with the help of a function 'i-frame' that maps the topic Situation sp 
and the set of alternative situations / to a subset A S of the situations in 
/ that includes sp,b and to limit quantification to AS. The latter subset 
of / will be called the i - f r a m e of sp under I or the set of sp-alternatives 
under I . A second restriction comes of course from the obvious requirement 
that alternative situations have to support the antecedent infon. But now 
to say that for each such s there must be an 5' anywhere in the world 
under considerat ion that Supports the consequent (cf. Barwise 1989, 274) 
would certainly miss the intuition behind the notion of aecompaniment. M y 
counterproposal, inspired by Kratzer's "accidental negation" (1989, 646) is 
to further require that the alternative Situation be rieh enough to decide 
the consequent infon. One could speak thus of locally (i.e., in the intended 
Situat ion frame) strict i m p l i c a t i o n . This amounts to the fol lowing def init ion 
( ' / G s-anchors(cr)' is to be read as ' / is an s-anchor for er'): 
(D4) Truth condition for contents with conditional propositions: 
((s sup i /c r ( r ) ) , / ,< / ) 
4Location is not an argument role of raining; on the contrary, rain situations are 
possible arguments of being located at. 
5 ' i - ' Stands for indicative. The corresponding 's-' for subjunetive would not have to 
meet this requirement. But this will remain my only remark about subjunetive condi-
tionals in this paper. 
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is true iff 
Vs'V/[s ' € i-frame(s,7) & / G s'-anchors(i/ <T(T)) 
k s' sup cr[f) & s' dec r[f]} : s' sup r[f). 
A content w i t h the propos i t ion that s Supports a condi t iona l infon as factual 
part and w i t h / and a corresponding pre-ordering as Virtual part is true just 
in case for all situations sf in the i-frame of s under / and all s'-anchors / for 
the c-infon such that s' b o t h (a) Supports the / -anchored antecedent infon 
and (b) decides the /-anchored consequent infon, it holds that sf supports 
the /-anchored consequent infon, i.e., that it decides it positively. This 
rules out that situations that fail to support the consequent infon simply 
because they are not rieh enough to even decide it make a c-proposition 
false. O u r i n i t i a l example in this section, 
(1) It is not the case that it thunders if it lightens. 
may serve as a good illustration, since scenes, i.e., purely visual situations, 
would verify (1) without requirement (b), because they do not include the 
acoustic aspects of a S i tuation. 
Suppose Max adds to his above-mentioned monologue: "If it is six 
o'clock, then Joe is getting up now in Hawaii," his assertion is accepted, 
M i a says: "It is six o 'clock," and this is accepted as well. The effect is that 
the intended topic Si tuat ion is widened (aecommodation) to include not just 
Max's and Mia's discourse Situat ion but also what Joe is actual ly doing in 
Hawaii. Thus the truth of the resulting accepted content will also depend 
o n Joe. That is my basic p icture of the effect of u p d a t i n g the content by 
adding a conditional issue. 
Before going on to the last section I will add one remark. It has the 
purpose to point out that aecording to this picture, the difference between 
a straight and a conditional proposition has two aspects: First it is the dif-
ference between implicit and explicit antecedents. Remember that in our 
picture of a proposition, any proposition q asserted in a discourse is implic-
itly conditional on the initialization from which the discourse started. A 
conditional proposition ifp then q therefore explicitly re-relativizes the im-
plicitly conditional q. Second, there is the difference between those proposi-
tions that quantify over topic situations and those that don't. Conditional 
propositions are one kind that do, but so are epistemic and deontic and 
habitual propositions, that are standardly called modal propositions. So 
we have formally captured the typologically motivated finding that condi-
tionality is a modal concept too. 
2.3 Two Puzzles and their Treatment in Update Semantics 
W i t h this picture of conditionalization as restriction by locally strict impli-
cation in mind let us attack two puzzles. 
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Modus-Ponens Conditionals 
The first one has to do with what I call modus-ponens conditionals, namely 
conditionals that are asserted in a discourse Situation where the truth of 
the antecedent is in the factual content background. 6 The puzzle is one 
for the Gricean account: Wi th material implication this is equivalent with 
an assertion of the consequent, so why do people bother to utter a whole 
conditional? Are they just talkative, violating the maxim of quantity? I 
think not. I think they are saying something different, in fact, something 
more. 
Suppose we are talking about some work you did with a Computer, and 
you have just told me by uttering (8) that you didn't save before quitting. 
(8) I didn't save before quitting. 
I believe you, and the factual content background is correspondingly up-
dated. Then I say (9): 
(9) If you didn't save before quitting, then the nie is lost. 
According to my analysis this is not locally equivalent with (10) (as the 
material implication analysis would predict, since p entails ((p —* q) <-> q ) ) , 
but logically stronger. That is, (9) entails (10) in such a context, but not 
vice versa. 
(10) The file is lost. 
What (9) says on that background in addition to what (10) says is that your 
failing to save before quitting does not just happen to come along with the 
file being lost, but that it requires it, in other words that any relevant case 
of the former comes with a case of the latter. And this means that in a 
Situation where you quit three times without saving, three flies must be lost 
in order to make (9) true. By contrast, if in that same Situation only the 
most salient file is lost, then (10) would come out true, whereas (9) would 
be false. 
So far for the first puzzle, the non-redundancy of modus-ponens con-
ditional utterances. The difference between (9) and (10) is modeled in 
update semantics by different Updates that result in propositions with dif-
ferent truth conditions. There remains one problem I have not addressed 
so far: How does modus ponens work at all? If the factual background 
Situation Supports the antecedent infon, then clearly there is an sf in the 
i-frame of s, namely s itself, and a corresponding / such that s Supports 
the antecedent infon, but it may still fail to Support the consequent infon 
simply because it fails to include all the relevant constituents. Here I think 
we need some sort of accommodation: if the topic Situation is too "thin" 
6Here I disagree with Hans Rott, who Claims that "ifs are accepted only if the an-
tecedent is not accepted" (1986, 356) and therefore has to deny the very existence of 
modus-ponens conditionals. 
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to decide the consequent infon, it is pragmatically enriched to do so (as 
in the Max, Mia , and Joe story above), and then the consequent follows. 
This means, given our definition of a Stretch of discourse through identity 
of topic Situation, that sometimes, the acceptance of a proposition with a 
content that entails the antecedent of an accepted c-proposition induces the 
beginning of an new Stretch of discourse. 
Unconditionals 
The second puzzle is posed by an apparent counterexample to my claim that 
conditionals restrict or relativize the validity of the consequent. There is a 
class of seemingly conditional constructions that do exactly the opposite: 
Instead of making a claim depend on some circumstance and therefore in 
an intuitive sense weakening it (except in the special case of modus-ponens 
conditionals just discussed), they strengthen it in the same intuitive sense 
by claiming that its holds independent of the choice from some alternatively 
conceivable circumstances. A n d with this, as is easy to see, I am Coming 
back to the unconditionals, because they are the construction type I am 
talking about here. 
Barwise (1986) has drawn attention to the fact that a conditional like 
(11) presupposes normal background conditions to obtain such as that there 
is no pollen around that makes Ciaire rub her eyes and so on. 7 
(11) If Ciaire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy. 
But human languages allow us to get rid of these background assumptions 
(or at least some of them 8), for instance by saying (12) instead of (11): 
(12) Whatever the circumstances, if Ciaire rubs her eyes, then she is 
sleepy. 
So normal conditionals impose further conditions on backgrounds that are 
restricted any way, but clauses like 4 Whatever . . . ' are able to remove back-
ground restrictions and thereby strengthen the claim they modify. That's 
why I have come to call them "unconditionals." Further examples are (13) 
and (14): 
(13) Wherever you go, I will find you. 
(14) Whether you like it or not, your talk was simply boring. 
7Sentence (11) could be paraphrased as 'Under default circumstances, if Ciaire rubs 
her eyes, then she is sleepy', if the latter way of phrasing it would not invite the inference 
that non-default circumstances are taken into consideration, which is exactly what the 
Barwise example wants to rule out. 
8This specification has been inspired by the following remark of an anonymous referee: 
"Precisely what seems to be eliminated . . . is various conditions we might be aware of as 
possibilities but not those we are not aware of." I doubt he would come through with 
this line of defense in a court trial where a crucially unconditional promise is at stake, 
but there are certainly contexts where the 'whatever' is interpreted more generously, i.e., 
in a more restricted way. 
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Interestingly enough, unconditionals seem to be encoded in most languages 
by interrogative clauses, more precisely by alternative and constituent in-
terrogatives. How come? Interrogatives of this kind define sets of issues 
(by enumeration or by parametric characterization) as representing exhaus-
tively the ränge of options that are currently taken into consideration. And 
this exhaustiveness is exactly what causes the unconditionalization effect: 
If all options that come into question require g, then <j, unless you are un-
lucky enough to not even have taken into consideration what really is the 
case, i.e., unless your frame is entirely mistaken. 
Standard conditionals on the other hand, even if they are of a disjunc-
tive or generalizing (i.e., existentially quantified) form, do not implicate 
that they exhaust what comes into question, 9 therefore they don't have in 
general the strengthening effect. Let us discuss first the disjunctive type 
and compare (15) with (16): 
(15) If you take the plane to Antwerp, the trip will take three hours; if 
you take the car or go by train, it will take ten hours. 
(16) ?If you take the plane to Antwerp, the trip wil l take three hours; 
whether you take the car or go by train, it will take ten hours. 
Example (16) doesn't sound as correct as (15), because it presents going 
by car or by train as the only options under consideration where taking 
the plane is in the set of thematic issues. This can be only accepted if we 
suppose that after the first part of the sentence, the thematic issues are 
redefined, and this hypothesis is corroborated by the Observation that the 
acceptability of (16) increases with the length of a pause after its first half. 
Generalizing unconditionals behave analogically. 1 0 Compare (17) and 
(18): 
(17) Whatever she wears, Amanda looks pretty. 
(18) If she wears something, Amanda looks pretty. 
Why does (17) sound like a compliment, whereas (18) sounds like a macho-
joke that amounts to quite the contrary? Because (17) invites to take only 
situations into consideration, where Amanda is dressed, (18) does not carry 
such a restriction and in fact makes us think of the cases where she is not, 
inviting the inference that then she does not look pretty. 
This suggests the following definitions: 
(D5) Truth condition for contents with disjunctive unconditional proposi-
tions: 
((s sup whether E(r ) ) ,7 , </) 
is true iff 
'Hans Rott (p.c.) suggests that in effect they implicate the contrary. 
'The following examples are repeated from Zaefferer (1987). 
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Vs'V/[s ' G i-frame(s ,7) & / G s'-anchors(w/ietfier E(r)) & 
3a G E : s' s u p cr[/] & s' dec r[f}} : s' s u p r [ / ] . 
A content w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n that s Supports a d is junctive uncondi-
t iona l infon as factual part and w i t h I and a corresponding pre-ordering as 
Virtual part is true just i n case for all s i tuations sf i n the i-frame of s under 
/ and a l l s'-anchors / for the whole infon such that s' b o t h (a) Supports one 
of the / -anchored antecedent infons a n d (b) decides the / -anchored conse-
quent infon, it holds that s' Supports the / -anchored consequent infon. 
(D6) Appropriateness condition for contributions involving disjunctive un-
condit ionals: 
A discourse contribution w i t h propositional content 
(s sup whether E(r)) 
is appropriate on a Virtual b a c k g r o u n d (/,</) iff 
Vs'V/[s ' G i-frame(s, J) & / G s'-anchors(w/ie*/ier E(r))] : 
3a G E : s' sup a[f}. 
(D7) Truth c o n d i t i o n for contents w i t h generalizing u n c o n d i t i o n a l propo-
sitions: 
((5 sup x-ever a ( r ) ) , J , </) 
is true iff 
W V / f s ' G i - f r a m e ( s , / ) & / G s'-a,nchors(x-ever a(r)) & 
s' sup {3xa)[f\ & sf dec r[f}) : s' sup r [ / ] . 
A content w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n that s Supports a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l infon 
that generalizes over x as factual p a r t , a n d w i t h I a n d a corresponding pre-
ordering as Virtual part is true just i n case for all s i tuations s' i n the i-frame 
of s under / a n d all s'-anchors / for the whole infon such that s' both (a) 
Supports the / -anchored existent ia l x-closure of the antecedent infon a n d 
(b) decides the / -anchored consequent infon, i t holds that s1 Supports the 
/-anchored consequent infon, i.e., that it decides it positively. 
(D8) Appropriateness c o n d i t i o n for contr ibut ions involving generalizing 
uncondit ionals : 
A discourse contribution w i t h propositional content 
(s sup x-ever a{r)) 
is appropriate on a Virtual background (/,</) iff 
V s ' V / ^ ' G i - f r a m e ( s , / ) & / G s ' -anchors^-ewer cr(r))] : 
s' sup (3xa)[f]. 
So the rule is: If the antecedent of a c-proposit ion exhausts the indicative 
frame of the current topic S i tuat ion, t h e n a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l is appropriate , 
i f not, a regulär condi t ional . In each case it should be encoded accordingly, 
i f the language allows for dist inct encoding. 
It remains to Supplement our def in i t ion (D4) by a corresponding appro-
priateness condi t ion: 
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(D9) Appropriateness c o n d i t i o n for c o n t r i b u t i o n s involv ing Standard con-
dit ionals: 
A discourse contr ibut ion w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content 
(s sup i f a ( r ) ) 
is appropriate on a V i r t u a l b a c k g r o u n d (/, </) iff 
-.Vs'V/[s ; € i-frame(s, J) & / G 5 /-anchors(z/cr(r))] : 
s' sup o~[f}. 
So it turned out that a l though i n t u i t i v e l y the difference between uncon-
dit ionals and condit ionals seems to be s t r i k i n g at t imes, it lies only i n the 
appropriateness condit ions of their utterance. They are the reason why the 
t r u t h condit ions of the result ing u p d a t e d backgrounds are different (entail-
ing versus not entai l ing the consequent), a l t h o u g h the t r u t h condit ions of 
the propos i t ion involved i n the update are not . 
Unconditionals as Indefinite Modus-Ponens Conditionals 
We have c la imed that condi t iona l propos i t ions are about Updates and that 
therefore u p d a t i n g by a c -proposi t ion is some sort of meta-update that con-
cerns other Updates, be they i n the future or i n the past. Now we can use 
this general picture i n order to differentiate between Standard condi t ion-
als, modus-ponens condit ionals , a n d u n c o n d i t i o n a l s . It turns out that the 
latter two are closely related. If we u p d a t e w i t h respect to a background 
that supports already the antecedent i n f o n , then we have a modus-ponens 
c o n d i t i o n a l , a n d the consequent follows immediately. If we update w i t h 
respect to a background that supports at least one of the enumerated an-
tecedent infons, or at least one i n s t a n t i a t i o n of the parametr ic antecedent 
infon, then we have an u n c o n d i t i o n a l , a n d the consequent follows again. 
Standard condit ionals , by contrast, are used i n Updates about future Up-
dates or about Updates that are presently not accepted, so the consequent 
does not follow. 
Finally, i f we now look back at the i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between lexical , 
phrasal and clausal condit ionals w i t h our semantic differentiations i n m i n d , 
it turns out that not only non-argument a l ternat ive a n d constituent inter-
rogatives, but that also some of the supposed lexical a n d phrasal condi t ion-
als are i n real ity uncondit ionals , n a m e l y n o n - t e m p o r a l always a n d never, 
as wel l as phrases like in any case, or under all circumstances, i n short all 
those where exhaustiveness is bui l t into the l ex ica l or phrasal meaning. 
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